It is commonly stated that ascending price or second price auctions allocate goods e±ciently, to those who value them most. This implies that the more bidders at the auction stage the more e±cient the¯nal allocation. We review this statement when bidders have private information both on a private element and a common element. While the¯nal allocation need not be ex post e±cient, we show that when bidders are ex ante symmetric, more competition at the auction yields higher e±ciency on expectation. When bidders are ex ante asymmetric -in particular with respect to the information on the common element -the statement need no longer be true.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that competition is always good to promote e±ciency in ascending price or sealed-bid second-price auctions. The best known theory due ¤ We would like to thank Motty Perry, Jean Tirole and seminar participants in summer in Tel Aviv (1998), Gerzensee ESSET meeting (1998), Toulouse IDEI, and Paris (Roy) for helpful comments. jehiel@enpc.fr and University College London, e-mail: p.jehiel@ucl.ac.uk.
to Vickrey that supports this conclusion is based on the private value paradigm in which (there is one object for sale and) the private information held by every bidder bears solely on his/her own valuation of the object for sale. Then ascending price or second price auctions allocate the good e±ciently: that is, to the bidder who values it most. Thus, the more participants at the auction stage, the more e±cient the¯nal allocation, which means that competition at the auction stage is good for e±ciency.
Remarkably, in the private value paradigm, this conclusion holds true whatever the informational structure of the bidders, in particular, whether bidders are ex ante symmetric or not.
Since the pioneering work of Vickrey, the auction paradigm has been extended to cover situations in which the private information held by a bidder a®ects the valuation of every bidder, the so-called a±liated value paradigm (see in particular Milgrom and Weber 1982) . We note that relatively little attention has been paid to the issue of e±ciency of (standard) auctions in such a setup. 1 Besides, most of the literature on a±liated value auctions assumes that the private information held by bidders is one-dimensional and that bidders are ex ante symmetric. 2 In this paper, we wish to analyze the value of competition in ascending or second price auctions when bidders may have multi-dimensional private information and bidders may or may not be ex ante symmetric. This question is of practical importance, since it may help assess whether government agencies should systematically favor the participation of the maximum number of bidders at the auction stage or whether (and how) they should be more selective in the pre-quali¯cation procedure.
Our interest in multidimensional private information lies in the fact that, in many Bulow-Klemperer (1998) and Perry-Reny (1999a) .
a±liated) value paradigm. Insofar as the private information held on the private and the common element are not related in a deterministic way, the multidimensional setup is more appropriate. For illustrative purpose, consider the case of procurement auctions. Bidders have in general private information on their own cost structure, which is the private value element. They may also have some private information about the general conditions of the task (like the quality of the grounds on which the highway must be built or the shape of the demand when the task includes the provision of services), which is the common value element. We believe that in many situations, these various pieces of information concern very di®erent aspects of the activity of the bidding¯rm, and are not in general related in a speci¯c way.
Our interest in ex ante asymmetries among bidders lies in the fact that, in many applied contexts, bidders are not all (ex ante) similar. One important such asymmetry in procurement auctions is between incumbents and entrants. In this case, asymmetry is likely to bear on the informational structure: Incumbents are presumably better informed about the common value element. 3 Other asymmetries may concern technological aspects: Bidding¯rms may vary with respect to their choice of technology; For those¯rms using the same technology (a subset of all bidders), the cost structure is likely to share some common value element.
We consider a model that allows both for asymmetries among bidders and for multidimensional private signals. The general setup that we consider is as follows.
There is one object for sale. Each bidder i's valuation is a®ected both by a private element µ i and a vector of common characteristics w. Bidders may be a®ected differently by the common value characteristics (to account for potential technological asymmetries, as explained above). Furthermore, each bidder i is assumed to know his private value element µ i and some subset of characteristics (relevant to his payo®) of the common element w.
We analyze second price and ascending price auctions in such a setup assuming that bidders are risk-neutral, that the information structure is common knowledge among all bidders, and that all bidders know who is present at the auction stage. In particular, when comparing the equilibrium outcome of the auction with or without a given bidder, we take into account the possible change of bidding strategy of the remaining bidders as a response to the change of information (about who is present at the auction stage).
A preliminary insight is the following. In both the second price and the ascending price auctions, as long as the private information held by bidders is multidimensional, 4 there are always realizations of signals such that the¯nal outcome would have been more e±cient if the winner of the auction had not participated in the auction. So from an ex post viewpoint it is not the case that more bidders at the auction stage necessarily results in more (ex post) e±cient¯nal outcomes. This result holds true whether bidders are ex ante symmetric or not. It is a consequence of the observation that in all mechanisms, the¯nal allocation must be ex post ine±cient with positive probability whenever bidders have multidimensional signals. 5 The main insights of the paper concern the e®ect on expected e±ciency of having one more bidder at the auction stage (that is, it concerns the e®ect of competition at the auction stage on e±ciency). Our¯rst result concerns the symmetric case. For a reasonably wide class of symmetric settings, we show that in either second price or ascending price auctions, the presence of an extra bidder is always good for e±ciency in expectation.
We next explore the e®ect of having one more bidder in asymmetric cases. Our main insight is that both in second price and in ascending price auctions there are 4 It is su±cient that one bidder has a two-dimensional signal and that the distribution of this two-dimensional signal be independent from the private information of other bidders. 5 In a context where bidders have more dimensions of information than there are alternatives (like in the one object -externality free -auction analyzed in our paper), such a claim is discussed in Maskin (1992) . Such a claim turns out to be much more general, and holds even if bidders have fewer signals than there are relevant alternatives to them (see Jehiel and Moldovanu 1999) .
situations in which expected e±ciency is lower when one more bidder participates in the auction. 6 In such contexts, more competition at the auction stage deteriorates expected e±ciency.
The situations with this property analyzed in this paper all share the feature that the additional bidder has some extra information that is relevant to other bidders and that these other bidders do not have. When the additional bidder has no such information (that is relevant to other bidders), we show (for a wide class of situations)
that both in ascending price and in second price auctions, expected e±ciency is higher when this extra bidder participates at the auction.
The situations we identify illustrate two di®erent sources of (expected) ine±-ciency according to whether second price or ascending price auctions are considered.
In the second price auction situations we analyze, the presence of the extra bidder is ine±cient because the extra bidder gets too often the object while the other bidders are potentially more e±cient.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The additional bidder (an incumbent) is informed about a common element that the other bidders (who are least two) do not know (they are entrants, say). When the incumbent bidder is not present, the entrant bidders take the common value element to be equal to its expected value, and the more e±cient entrant bidder gets the object. When the incumbent bidder is in, he gets the object -even if the entrant bidders are more e±cient than himwhenever the realization of the common element is su±ciently high. This holds true despite the fact that entrant bidders adjust their bidding strategy to the presence of the incumbent bidder: In order to avoid the incumbent bidder getting the object for high realizations of the common element, the entrant bidders would have to bid very high so that (because they are least two) they would end up paying a high price 6 This result would also hold true in¯rst price auctions. However, it is less surprising, since even in the private value paradigm with one-dimensional private signals, one could generate such examples (this is a standard argument against the use of¯rst price auctions). What our paper shows is that even second price or ascending price auctions may have this feature in a broader setup.
even for low realizations of the common value element, thus resulting in expected losses for entrant bidders; this cannot hold in equilibrium.
In ascending price auctions, we identify another source of (expected) ine±ciency.
Here the mere presence of the additional bidder modi¯es the course of competition between the remaining bidders even though (in the basic example) this additional bidder never acquires the object. The point is that the price at which the extra bidder drops out conveys a di®erent information to the remaining bidders (because some of them share some information with the dropping bidder that the others do not have), and the induced competition between the remaining bidders is then biased in a way that can be detrimental to expected e±ciency, as we show.
In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we analyze the value of competition in second price and ascending price auctions. We¯rst derive a positive result for the symmetric case. We next explore the asymmetric case. Concluding remarks are gathered in Section 4.
The model
Payo® structure: There is one object for sale. We consider n potential bidders i 2 N = f1; :::; ng: When a bidder does not get the object, he gets a payo® normalized to zero.
The value of the object to bidder i is assumed to depend on a private element µ i and on a vector of K characteristics w = (w 1 ; :::; w K ) of the object for sale. 7 This value is denoted v i (µ; w).
In order to illustrate the main results of our paper, we will sometimes analyze more speci¯c formulation of the preferences of the bidders. Here are two examples Example 1 (Additive preferences; w purely common) For each bidder i :
7 With some abuse of notation, K will sometimes also denote the set of all characteristics k.
Example 2 (Additive preferences; w partially common) For each bidder i, there exists a subset of characteristics K i such that:
The interpretation of Example 2 may be as follows. Given the technology used by bidder i, only a subset of characteristics K i are relevant to his assessment of the value of the object.
Information structure: Each bidder i knows his private element µ i , and has some private (partial) information on w. The set of variables µ i ; w k , i 2 N, k 2 K are distributed according to a joint density denoted by f (¢). This density is assumed to be common knowledge among all bidders.
We describe bidder i's information about the common characteristics by de¯ning for each bidder i the set H i ½ K of characteristics of which bidder i knows the realization. In case H i = ;, bidder will be said to be uninformed. In case H i = K, bidder i will be said to be fully informed. In all other cases, bidder i will be said to be partially informed.
This informational di®erentiation between bidders seems particularly relevant for the distinction between incumbents and potential entrants in a procurement auction:
Incumbent¯rms are likely to know more of the characteristics of the object for sale than potential entrants do.
Auction formats:
The good is to be sold through an auction procedure. We will consider two auction formats: the second price sealed-bid auction and the ascending price auction, and we will mostly focus on equilibria that do not use dominated strategies. The ascending price auction is de¯ned as follows. 10 The price starts at a low level, say 0, at which each bidder is present. The price gradually increases. Each bidder may decide to quit at every moment. When a bidder quits, this is commonly observed by every bidder. The auction stops when there is only one bidder left. The object is allocated to that bidder at the current price. A strategy for each bidder speci¯es a price at which it quits as a function of current public information and private information. 11
Policy issues: We are interested in whether or not promoting the maximum participation at the auction stage is good for e±ciency. We distinguish ex post e±ciency and ex ante e±ciency.
If the object is allocated to bidder i, (ex post) the social value is given by v i (µ i ; w), which thus measures ex post e±ciency. 12 For each auction format, and for any given strategy pro¯le ¾ of the bidders, ex ante e±ciency will thus be measured by (remember that i 0 denotes the winner of the auction):
9 If there are several bidders with maximal bids, one of them is selected at random with equal probability to get the good, and pays that bid to the seller. 10 We present here the continuous time/price version of the ascending price auction. This raises some technical di±culties regarding the de¯nition of equilibria in undominated strategies. The equilibria we will refer to are the limits as " > 0 tends to 0 of the equilibria in undominated strategies of the corresponding game in which time is discrete and after each round the price increases by the increment ". 11 In case all the remaining bidders quit at the same date, one of them is selected at random with equal probability to get the object. He then pays the current price. 12 E±ciency refers here to productive e±ciency (since we abstract from market structure considerations).
Although we are primarily interested in expected e±ciency, we start with an example that permits us to assess the e®ect of competition on ex post e±ciency.
An introductory example: To¯x ideas, consider example 1 with two bidders i = 1; 2 and two characteristics k = 1; 2. Assume that H 1 = f1g and H 2 = f2g, that is, bidders 1 and 2 have private information on di®erent characteristics of the object.
Given µ i , w 1 and w 2 , bidder i's valuation is
The ex post e±cient bidder is denoted by i ¤ . We have:
We assume that all the variables µ i and w k are iid (in particular, µ i and w k are drawn from the same distribution). Bidders 1 and 2 are thus symmetric, and we will analyze the symmetric equilibrium (in undominated strategies) of the sealed bid second price auction.
De¯ne the bid function:
or equivalently, since µ j and w j are drawn from the same distribution (hence E[w j j
It is readily veri¯ed that these bid functions constitute a symmetric equilibrium of the sealed bid second price auction (and of the ascending price auction in which these bids should be interpreted as the prices at which bidders drop out). 13 It follows that the object is not necessarily allocated to the most e±cient bidder (i.e. the bidder with maximal µ i ). Speci¯cally, consider the event in which
13 The two auction formats are equivalent when there are only two bidders.
Then bidder 2 gets the object even though he is not the most e±cient bidder. As a matter of fact, it can be shown quite generally that under the assumed informational structure, there is no sale mechanism that allocates the good to the most e±cient bidder (i.e. the bidder with maximal µ i ) with probability 1 (see Appendix).
The observation above implies that the presence of bidder 2 may actually deteriorate ex post e±ciency: under the event considered above, and if bidder 2 were absent, bidder 1 would have got the object and the outcome would thus have been more e±cient. 14 Of course the presence of bidder 2 does note always deteriorate ex post e±ciency.
Speci¯cally, whenever
the presence of bidder 2 improves e±ciency. We will now analyze the more interesting case in which bidders are not informed about the same characteristics (so that ex post ine±ciencies may arise). We now de¯ne a relatively broad class of symmetric settings of this sort. and Á(w k ) such that:
Note that in a symmetric setting as described above, we may de¯ne
and bidder i is the most e±cient bidder if h(µ i ; w i ) is largest among bidders. The following Proposition establishes that both in the second price and the ascending price auctions (and by restricting attention to symmetric equilibria), expected e±ciency increases with the number of bidders.
Proposition 1 Consider the symmetric setting. Suppose that 1) Proof. It is standard to show that under the three¯rst conditions a) there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium and b) equilibrium bids are strictly increasing functions of u(µ i ; w i ). 15 Given this property, the object is allocated to the bidder with highest u(µ i ; w i ). Net of the common component
, the expected welfare is equal to:
where
By symmetry, we have
15 In a sealed bid second price auction, player i's equilibrium bid satis¯es:
which is equal to°m(u(µi; and because the random variables (µ i ; w i ) are independent from one another, we
Since E[h(µ k ; w k ) j u(µ k ; w k )] =´(z), (2) implies:
Since´0(z)¸0, and since for any z, H(z) increases with the number of bidders, we conclude that welfare increases with the number of bidders.
The Asymmetric Case
Symmetry plays an important role in Proposition 1. We now investigate asymmetric settings, and we analyze whether the conclusion that more bidders at the auction stage enhances e±ciency is true.
Analyzing asymmetric settings in auctions is in general very hard because in equilibrium bidding strategies are the result of a sophisticated inference process. Besides, the addition of one more bidder may completely change this inference process making the comparison very di±cult. Our relatively simple information structure will nevertheless allow us to carry out these comparisons for three broad kinds of informational asymmetries.
Asymmetric setting 1 : 8i 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g, H i = ;; H n = K.
Asymmetric setting 2 : K¸2; n = 3; H 1 = f1g; H 2 = ;; H n = K.
Asymmetric setting 3 : 8i 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g,
In all three settings, we will be interested in the e®ect of allowing bidder n to participate. For simplicity, we will assume throughout this section that all the variable µ i ; w k are independent from one another.
The three settings di®er in several respects. The¯rst di®erence is about the information held by the extra bidder n. In asymmetric settings 1 and 2, the extra bidder is fully informed of the common value element; in asymmetric setting 3, the extra bidder is totally uninformed of the common value element. Thus, in settings 1 and 2, the extra bidder may be thought of as an incumbent while in setting 3 he may be thought of as an entrant.
The second di®erence is about the private information held by bidders other than the extra bidder. In setting 1, these are totally uninformed of the common element (they may thus be thought of as entrants); in setting 3, they are fully informed of the common element (they may thus be thought of as incumbents); in setting 2, they are partially and asymmetrically informed of the common element (bidder 2 knows more of the common element than bidder 1 does).
Our results are as follows. In asymmetric setting 1, we will show that the participation of the extra bidder n may deteriorate (ex ante) e±ciency if the object is allocated with a sealed bid second price auction. In contrast, if the object is allocated with an ascending price auction, the participation of the informed bidder may only enhance e±ciency.
In asymmetric setting 2, we will show that the comparison between the ascending price auction and the sealed bid second price auction may be reversed: we exhibit conditions under which e±ciency is lower when the informed bidder participates in the ascending price auction, but not in the sealed bid second price auction.
In asymmetric setting 3, we will show that the participation of bidder n is positive in both the sealed bid second price auction, and in the ascending auction.
To conclude this short presentation, note that in asymmetric setting 3, the bidding strategy of bidders i = 1; :::n ¡ 1 is una®ected by the presence of the extra bidder n. This is because in this setting bidders i = 1; :::n ¡ 1 have nothing to infer from bidder n. (This is, of course, not the case in either settings 1 or 2.) Our results thus suggest that it is the bias on equilibrium bids induced by the extra bidder that may invalidate the positive e®ect of competition. Furthermore, our analysis of set-tings 1 and 2 will highlight two distinct sources of ine±ciencies that may arise due
to the presence of the extra bidder. We will come back at length to these sources of ine±ciencies.
Adding an informed bidder to uninformed bidders
We consider asymmetric setting 1. To get some intuition, consider¯rst the simple payo® structure described in Example 1:
and assume that there are 3 bidders: bidders 1 and 2 are uninformed of w (H 1 = H 2 = ;) whereas bidder n = 3 is fully informed of w (H 3 = K). Also assume that the informed bidder 3 is always less e±cient than the two uninformed bidders i = 1; 2.
That is,
Consider the sealed bid second price auction. When bidder 3 is absent, the equilibrium bid of the uninformed bidder i = 1; 2 with private element µ i is
Thus, the second price auction allocates the good e±ciently, to the bidder with highest µ i .
We now show that the presence of bidder 3 must deteriorate e±ciency. Suppose (by contradiction) that the presence of bidder 3 does not deteriorate e±ciency. Then because of (4) bidder 3 must get the object with probability 0. So assume that (in equilibrium) bidder 3 never gets the object. Since bidders 1 and 2 choose their bids independently, one of the two uninformed bidders, say bidder 1, must choose to bid b 1¸¹ µ 3 + ¹ w with probability 1 where ¹ w is the largest realization of P k2K w k . Otherwise, maxfb 1 ; b 2 g would be smaller than or equal to some b < ¹ µ 3 + ¹ w with positive probability, and bidder 3 would be able to secure positive expected pro¯ts, contradicting the premise that he does not get the object in equilibrium. Now observe that whenever bidder 2 wins, he must pay a price at least equal to b 1 , hence at least equal to ¹ µ 3 + ¹ w. However, bidder 2's expected value from winning the object is µ 2 +Ew (because bidder 3 is supposed not to get the object and because bidder 1's bid does not convey any information on w). When
bidder 2 with private element µ 2 will not acquire the object, since otherwise he would make losses. Thus bidder 1 should acquire the object. However, bidder 1 may be less e±cient than bidder 2, since condition (5) does not imply that µ 2 < µ 1 . To summarize, in any event where
the object would be allocated to bidder 1 even though he is not the most e±cient bidder. Clearly, since Ew < ¹ w, this event may have positive probability even when condition (3) holds. E±ciency is then deteriorated with positive probability.
The following proposition states more generally our result where bidder n (only) is assumed to know w while bidders i = 1; :::n ¡ 1 are totally uninformed about w: ). Also assume that bidder n is the most e±cient bidder with probability 0, and that the event 16 fE e w v(µ; e w) < v n (µ n ; w)g has strictly positive probability. Then the presence of bidder n deteriorates ex ante e±ciency when the object is allocated with a second price auction. Besides, in any equilibrium (in undominated strategies) bidder n gets the object with positive probability.
Proof. For expositional simplicity, we assume that w is one-dimensional, and we let ¹ w denote the largest realization of w. Consider¯rst the case without the informed bidder n. Then bidder i with highest value of E w v(µ i ; w) gets the object. Given that the uninformed bidders have the same valuation function, this bidder is also arg max i<n µ i who is the most e±cient uninformed bidder. Given that the informed bidder n is the most e±cient with probability zero, we obtain that the most e±cient bidder i = 1; :::n gets the object.
Consider now the case with the informed bidder n. Bidder n's dominant strategy is to bid b n (µ n ; w) = v n (µ n ; w):
Suppose (by contradiction) that the presence of bidder n does not deteriorate e±-ciency. Then because bidder n is less e±cient than bidders i = 1; :::n ¡ 1, bidder n must get the object with probability 0. Since bidders choose their bids independently, at least one of the bidders i = 1; :::n ¡ 1 must choose to bid b i¸vn ( ¹ µ n ; ¹ w) with probability 1 . Suppose for example that b 1 > v n ( ¹ µ n ; ¹ w) with probability 1. Now observe that whenever bidder i < n, i 6 = 1 wins, he must pay a price at least equal to b 1 , hence at least equal to v n ( ¹ µ n ; ¹ w). However, bidder i's expected value from winning the object is E w v(µ i ; w) (because bidder n is supposed not to get the object and because bidder 1's bid does not convey any information on w). When
bidder i with private element µ i will not acquire the object, since otherwise he would make losses. When this condition is met for every uninformed bidder i < n, i 6 = 1 (this event has positive probability by assumption), bidder 1 should acquire the object. However, bidder 1 may be less e±cient than bidders i < n, i 6 = 1 , since condition (6) does not imply that µ i < µ 1 . To summarize, in any event where for all i < n, i 6 = 1
the object would be allocated to bidder 1 even though he is not the most e±cient bidder. This event has positive probability by assumption, which shows the ine±ciency result.
Regarding equilibria in undominated strategies, observe¯rst that bidder n must bid b n (µ n ; w) = v n (µ n ; w), since he has nothing relevant to infer from the other bids.
Suppose now (by contradiction) there is an equilibrium in undominated strategies in which the informed bidder n never acquires the object. Then bidder i, i < n, with
, since the event of winning would convey no information about the value of w. However, there are realizations of µ i ; µ n ; w such that E e w [v(µ i ; e w)] < v n (µ n ; w) contradicting the premise that bidder n never acquires the object.
When there is no competition among uninformed bidders
The presence of two (or more) uninformed bidders is key to the result of Proposition 2. If there is only one uninformed bidder (i.e. n = 2), the next result shows that the addition of the informed bidder n always improves e±ciency.
Proposition 3 Assume n = 2. The presence of the extra bidder n always improves expected e±ciency.
Proof. Let bidder 1 be the uninformed bidder with private value element µ 1 . Let bidder 2 be the informed bidder with private value element µ 2 and common value element w. The joint distribution of (µ 2 ; w) is denoted by ½(¢; ¢). We now show that for each realization of µ 1 , µ 1 = µ ¤ 1 , there is an expected e±ciency gain induced by the presence of the informed bidder.
17 Given a realization (µ 2 ; w), the informed bidder bids b 2 (µ 2 ; w) = v 2 (µ 2 ; w) (because he knows everything that is relevant to him). Let b 1 denote the equilibrium bid of the uninformed bidder (with type µ ¤ 1 ). The expected e±ciency gain (possibly negative) due to the presence of the informed bidder is
17 The expectation bears over µ2, w.
which can be rewritten as:
(by noting that b 2 (µ 2 ; w) = v 2 (µ 2 ; w)). Finally, observe that 
It follows that ¢¸0. Coming back to Proposition 2, we conclude that it is the competition between the uninformed bidders that is key to the deterioration of e±ciency when a less e±cient but informed bidder is present.
When there are many uninformed bidders
Several results in the literature suggest that some ine±ciencies arising when there are few agents may disappear when there are many agents. 18 We now show that the negative e®ect induced by the presence of the informed bidder may continue to hold even when there are many uninformed bidders.
Proposition 4 Let n¸3 bidders have the same valuation function
that is increasing in all arguments. Assume that the variables µ i i = 1; :::; n ¡ 1 are identically distributed over [0; 1], and that w is distributed over [w; w] µ [0; 1]. We let µ inf denote the private element of the informed bidder n, which is also distributed on
Consider any equilibrium that is symmetric among the uninformed bidders. In such an equilibrium, at the limit where n is very large, all n ¡ 1 uninformed bidders bid 18 See for example, Gul and Postlewaite (1992) and in an auction context Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1999).
below b ¤ with probability at least ® ¤ , that is:
Proof. Consider an equilibrium that is symmetric among the uninformed bidders.
Consider an uninformed bidder i with private element µ 
The term
) is weakly increasing in µ ¤ i and w. Besides, for the maximal value of
Since in equilibrium any bidder must be making non negative gains, we obtain:
Finally, let b (n¡1) denote the largest equilibrium bid of the n¡1 uninformed bidders.
In a symmetric equilibrium,
, which implies the result at the limit where n is large.
This result implies that at the limit where the number of uninformed bidders is very large, the addition of an informed bidder may cause an e±ciency loss. To see 19 Bidder i obtains a positive payo® only when the informed bidder n bids below b. The price he then pays is no smaller than b (n¡2) .
this, observe that whenever v(µ inf ; w) > b ¤ , the informed bidder must get the object with a probability no smaller than ® ¤ . If he had not been present, arg max i<n µ i would have got the object. For n very large, arg max i<n µ i is almost surely very close to 1.
Thus when n is arbitrarily large the presence of the informed bidder deteriorates e±ciency by (at least):
Ascending price auction
We conclude this part by observing that in an ascending price auction (instead of a second price auction), the presence of the informed bidder would not deteriorate e±ciency.
Proposition 5 Let bidder i = 1; :::n¡1 with valuation v i (¢; ¢) be uninformed (of w).
Let bidder n with valuation v n (¢; ¢) be informed of w. De¯ne´i(µ i ; z) = E(v i (µ i ; w) j v n (µ n ; w) = z) and assume that 0 < @ @z´i (µ i ; z) < 1 for all µ i . If the object is allocated with the ascending price auction, the presence of bidder n always improves expected e±ciency.
Proof. The ascending price auction without the informed bidder n allocates the good to the most e±cient uninformed bidder. Consider now the ascending price auction with all bidders. The informed bidder n (with private information µ n , w) remains at the auction until the price reaches the level b n = v n (µ n ; w): We next observe that as long as the informed bidder has not dropped out, and whatever the other uninformed bidders have done, an uninformed bidder i (with private information µ i ) remains at the auction until the price reaches the level b i where 20
This is because the expected value of the object to bidder i conditional on the actions of others depends solely on the price at which the informed bidder n drops out (bidder 20 The condition on´(¢) ensures that for each µi this bi is uniquely de¯ned and increasing in µi.
i has nothing relevant to infer from the price at which the other uninformed bidders drop out).
Once bidder n has dropped out, bidder i (if he has not dropped out yet) drops out at
Under each realization µ 1 ; :::; µ n¡1 ; z(= v n (µ n ; w)), the winner of the object is either the uninformed bidder for which´i(µ i ; z) is largest, or the informed bidder, depending on whether´i(µ i ; z) is larger or smaller than z.
From the de¯nition of the functions´i, expected e±ciency under the event fµ 1 ; :::; µ n¡1 ; zg is
Note that E z max i´i (µ i ; z)¸max i E z´i (µ i ; z), and that E z´i (µ i ; z) = E w (v i (µ i ; w)).
Since max i E w (v i (µ i ; w)) is the expected e±ciency associated with the auction when bidder n is absent, we obtain the desired result: for any realization fµ 1 ; :::; µ n¡1 g expected e±ciency is larger when bidder n is present than when he is absent.
Adding an informed bidder to asymmetrically informed bidders
We now illustrate how in asymmetric setting 2, the addition of an informed bidder may deteriorate (ex ante) e±ciency.
We consider a situation with three bidders i = 1; 2; 3 and two characteristics K = f1; 2g. We make the following assumption regarding the structure of the preference and information. Assumption 1 Preferences: as in Example 2, with K 1 = K 3 = K and K 2 = f2g:
The information structure thus corresponds to that of asymmetric setting 2:
Bidder 3 is fully informed of w = fw 1 ; w 2 g; Bidder 2 is totally uninformed. Bidder 1 is partially informed of w; he only knows w 1 .
The structure of preferences corresponds to the following:
A simple interpretation of this setup is as follows: w 2 represents a purely common value characteristic that applies to all bidders while w 1 represents a common characteristic that applies to bidders 1 and 3 only, for example because bidder 2 is known to use a technology di®erent from that of bidders 1 and 3.
Concerning the parameters µ i and w k , we make the following assumption. Note that Assumption 2 implies that the informed bidder 3 is always less e±cient than bidders 1 and 2. We will analyze the equilibria in undominated strategies of the ascending price auction and obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the presence of bidder 3 in the ascending price auction deteriorates expected e±ciency.
Proof. Consider¯rst the situation without the informed bidder 3. The private information held by i = 1; 2 is irrelevant for the determination of the valuation of bidder j 6 = i, j 2 f1; 2g. The auction can thus be analyzed as a private value ascending price auction: the most e±cient bidder among i = 1; 2 gets the object. 21
Since µ 1 > 0 and µ 3 = 0, the informed bidder 3 is always less e±cient than bidder 1, and therefore the ascending price auction without the informed bidder 3 allocates the good to the most e±cient bidder.
21 The strategy for bidder 1 (with private information µ1; w 1 ) is to drop out at price µ1+w 1 +E(w 2 )
(if bidder 2 is still present). The strategy for bidder 2 (with private information µ2) is to drop out at price µ2 + E(w 2 ).
Consider now the situation with all three bidders. It cannot allocate the good more e±ciently than the ascending price auction without the informed bidder 3, since in the latter case the most e±cient allocation is obtained. We will prove that it does strictly worse, thus showing that the addition of the informed bidder 3 deteriorates expected e±ciency.
We¯rst note that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for bidder 3 with private information (w 1 ; w 2 ) to drop out (since µ 3 = 0) at:
It is therefore optimal for bidders 1 and 2 to wait for bidder 3 to drop out, since the value for bidders 1 and 2 is always (whatever the realizations of µ i ; w i ) larger than b 3 (w 1 ; w 2 ) (this is because µ 1 > 0 and ¹
Let b 3 denote the price at which the informed bidder 3 drops out. At that price, there are two bidders left: bidders 1 and 2: From b 3 , bidder 1 (with private information µ 1 , w 1 ) can perfectly infer the value of the object to him, i.e. it is worth
22 He will thus remain in the auction until the price reaches the level:
For the allocation to be e±cient bidder 2 would have to perfectly infer the value of the object in equilibrium (since bidder 1 does). We know ckeck however that bidder 2 (with private information µ 2 ) can only imperfectly infer the value of the object in equilibrium. In equilibrium, she remains in the auction until the price reaches the level:
Since bidder 1's drop out price does not depend on w 1 , and since the random variable µ 1 ; w 1 ; w 2 are independent, bidder 2 drops out at price:
22 Note that the same conclusion would hold if bidder 1 knew µ1 only (and not w 1 ).
which con¯rms that bidder 2 in equilibrium only imperfectly infers the value of w 2 .
Bidder 1 (resp. bidder 2) obtains the good whenever
and the allocation is ine±cient for example when:
Comment 1:
The induced allocation need not be e±cient because in equilibrium, the inferences made by bidder 1 and 2 about the value of the purely common value w 2 di®er.
As a result, both types of mistake may occur in equilibrium: the object may be allocated to bidder 1 although bidder 2 is more e±cient (this occurs when bidder 2 underestimates w 2 ); and the object may be allocated to bidder 2 although bidder 1 is more e±cient (this occurs when bidder 2 overestimates w 2 ).
To illustrate this point, consider the case in which w Bidder 1 (resp. bidder 2) gets the object whenever
On the other hand, bidder 1 is more (resp. less) e±cient than bidder 2 whenever
Thus, whenever
the good is allocated to the less e±cient bidder among f1; 2g resulting in an e±ciency loss of¯¯µ 1 + w 1 ¡ µ 2¯a s compared with the situation in which bidder 3 is not present at the auction.
Comment 2:
If we consider the second price auction instead of the ascending price auction, the¯nal allocation is ex post e±cient even when all three bidders are present at the auction. Thus, the second price auction performs better in this case than the ascending price auction when all three bidders are present. To see this, observe that in a second price auction, bidders 1 and 2 would bid:
respectively (because the condition w 1 + ¹ w 2 < µ 2 implies that the informed bidder 3 cannot get the object in equilibrium). It follows that the¯nal allocation is ex post e±cient.
Comment 3:
The reason why the presence of the informed bidder deteriorates e±ciency in Proposition 6 is somewhat di®erent from that in Proposition 2. Here, the ine±cient informed bidder never acquires the object. However, his mere presence modi¯es the competition between bidders 1 and 2: It does so because the information conveyed by the strategy of the extra informed bidder is not the same for the two bidders i = 1; 2 in equilibrium.
Adding an uninformed bidder to informed bidders
The negative e®ect of competition observed in subsections 4.1 and 4.2 is due to the fact that the bidding strategy of the uninformed or partially informed bidders is a®ected by the presence of the extra informed bidder.
We now provide a class of situations (this is asymmetric setting 3) in which the presence of the extra bidder does not a®ect the bidding strategies of the remaining bidders. For this class, the addition of the extra bidder enhances e±ciency.
Consider the following setup. The common value element w is known to bidders i = 1; :::n ¡ 1; i.e. H i = K. Bidder n is uninformed of w, i.e. H n = ;. The common value element w is distributed according to g(¢). As before, each bidder i knows his own private value element µ i , which is distributed according to f i (¢). Given µ i and w, the value of the object to bidder i is v i (µ i ; w):
The participation of bidder n always raises e±ciency in second price or ascending price auctions.
Proof. Consider¯rst the second price auction. All informed bidders bid according
, and their bidding strategy is not a®ected by the participation of another bidder. Let v = max i·n¡1 v i (µ i ; w), and let f denote the distribution over v. When the entrant bidder bids b n+1 and makes the highest bid, the second highest bid is equal to v, hence his gain is equal to v n (µ n ; w) ¡ v. Thus his expected gain from bidding b n is equal to
For each realization µ n , the expected gain of the uninformed bidder thus coincides with the expected e±ciency change due to the presence of bidder n (note that the presence of bidder n does not change the allocation between the informed when in the event where bidder n does not get the object). Since, in equilibrium, the bidding strategy b n (µ n ) of the uninformed bidder satis¯es G(µ n ; b n (µ n ))¸0;
the participation of bidder n may only enhance e±ciency.
The analysis of ascending price auction is similar. Instead of looking at each realization µ n , we consider the random variables µ n ; v 1 ; :::v n¡1 and i 0 where v i = v i (µ i ; w); for i = 1; :::; n ¡ 1 and i 0 =arg max i<n v i , and we consider the realizations fµ n ; fv i g i6 =i 0 g. For each such realization, if bidder n modi¯es the¯nal allocation, expected e±ciency must increase (by the same argument as above).
Conclusion
This paper has shown that when bidders have multidimensional signals (on a private, a common and possibly a partially common element), the addition of one bidder at the auction stage may deteriorate expected e±ciency in asymmetric cases in either the second price or the ascending price auction. One should thus be cautious when recommending to systematically promote the maximum participation in procurement like auctions. 23 Speci¯cally, our analysis suggests that the addition of a bidder who does not have (much) information a®ecting the valuations of others is likely to be good for e±ciency. Thus, our analysis gives little ground to restricting the access to auctions of entrant bidders.
Restricting the access of bidders who have some information (relevant to other bidders) may be justi¯able in some cases, as our paper shows. A systematic analysis of access restriction deserves further research.
Proposition 8 There exists no sale mechanism and thus no auction format that allows to allocate the good to the ex post e±cient bidder with probability 1.
The technique of proof and argument is analog to that in Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) (see also Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1998) Thus, to satisfy the incentive constraints, it should be that q i (s i ) is a sole function of z i = µ i + w i .
Consider the rule that allocates the good to the most e±cient bidder with probability 1. That rule leads to q eff i (s i ) = Pr fµ i > µ j for all j 6 = ig, or after the change of variable:
where F j (¢) denoted the cumulative distribution of f j (¢). That function clearly depends on w i and therefore is not implementable whatever the mechanism to be considered.
